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Summary 
 
Of late, more and more politicians are telling us that we need decisiveness and that at long last 
decisions need to be made. The media is keen to pick up on these sounds. One could even rightfully 
claim that the media actively participates in this image-formation. Thus a situation is created that 
various commentators and scientists have come to refer to as a drama democracy: a democracy in 
which politics has become personified and theatrical. Displaying powerful images and directing the 
show have become more important for politicians than the implementation of policy. 
 However, this drama democracy is at loggerheads with everyday reality, in which complex 
policy issues, such as the restructuring of a housing estate, the realisation of water storage or the 
promotion of the quality of education have to be solved. The parties involved in that reality often want 
different things, and do not agree on the nature of the problem. Often we do not know what a good 
solution is at the beginning of the process, and knowledge of the network and the parties involved in 
making the decisions, as well as the implementation reality, is indispensable. Carefully managing 
these processes as well as ensuring various forms of democratic anchorage are crucial for finding good 
social outcomes. This involves commitment from various parties and a certain amount of dedication to 
the process instead of powerful, unilateral, political interventions.   
 
1 Introduction 
 
Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
In the summer of 2003, the City Elderman of Delft was believed to be enjoying the finest hour of his 
political and managerial career. Finally, the ‘railway tunnel’ project, that the municipality has been 
working on for so long, would begin the implementation phase, and money would become available. 
Together with Prorail, a department of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works as well as the 
administrator of the Dutch railways, the officials of the Delft municipality had been working, in the 
months prior to the summer of 2003, on possible variants for the tunnel that had to rid Delft of the 
railway section straight across the city centre. Things were looking good. The newly designed tunnel 
was cheaper than budgeted for and the Ministry of Transport and Public Works’ decision to implement 
the project seemed likely to occur.  
 
However, reaching this  moment of the negotiation process with Prorail had not been easy. By 2003, 
the project had already had a long history. It all started in 1988 when the first plans of the NS (Dutch 
Rail), which had not yet been privatized at that time, were laid out, to turn the section near Delft into 
four tracks, in the same way as the Rijswijk and Rotterdam sections had been built. NS suggested 
building an extra viaduct on the existing one, which would then make it about 15 meters high. There 
would then be two separate tracks – one for the slow trains and another for the express trains. Not 
surprisingly, this plan was not received favourably by the Delft municipality, because of the high 
barrier that would then be created through the city centre. The municipality faced the challenge of 
preventing what they saw as a horror scenario while at the same time coming up with an interesting as 
well as workable solution.  
 
This turned out to be no easy task. In the beginning, other important players were interested in the 
railway tunnel zone project. This was during the time when there were discussions about a high-speed 
train to Paris, and if such a train was to run on existing tracks, building a tunnel near Delft would be 
unavoidable. The discussions about the high-speed train ended with the decision not to use the existing 
track, but a separate track instead, and the other actors thus lost interest in the project. By now, it had 
become apparent that this would be a very complex project, and Dutch Rail as well as the ministry 
thought that the four-track section could wait. The withdrawal of crucial actors removed the possibility 
of a solution for the municipality to the problem of the Delft bottleneck. 
 Only after extensive canvassing by the municipality did the Dutch Lower Chamber decide in 
1998 that money would be made available through the Meerjarig Investerings Plan Transport (long-
term investment plan transport, MIT). After that, the game was kick-started and after a lengthy 
process, the municipality was able to agree on a covenant in 2002 with the other public parties 
(Ministry of Transport and Public Works, Housing, Regional Development and the Environment, the 
province of Zuid-Holland and the Haaglanden region) to begin working on a proposal for the 
improvement of the rail connection of Den Haag – Rotterdam (preferably through the use of a tunnel). 
The covenant indicated that there were as yet insufficient financial means to ensure the realisation of 
the tunnel, but spoke of an ‘effort obligation’ of all parties involved to ensure that the budget met the 
wish list. The Delft municipality and Prorail reviewed the variants and in the summer of 2003, a plan 
seemed to be ready that met most of the preconditions. However, all of a sudden, the funds appeared 
to have been removed from the budget of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works. In the summer 
of 2003, much to the municipality’s dismay, the plans were unceremoniously abandoned, leaving the 
chairman amazed and confused. 
 
Solving complex policy issues in networks 
The case of the Delft is one of many examples of a complex policy issue – or ‘wicked problem’ – (see 
Rittel & Webber, 1973; Hoppe & Van de Graaf, 1992; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Wicked problems 
are policy issues that involve many actors, where the actors often disagree about the nature of the 
problem and the desired solution. In addition, there is usually insufficient or controversial knowledge 
about these problems, which makes it difficult to interpret them and to find appropriate solutions for 
them.1 The aforementioned case is a classic example of a wicked problem. Is it a transport problem, as 
the Dutch Rail claims, or is it a noise problem, as the people who live alongside the track claim, or is it 
an environmental planning problem for the city, as the town council claims? 
 It is no easy task to come up with a solution for complex policy problems. The most important 
reason for this is that it almost always involves tricky conflicts between values. Should we prioritize 
transport values, liveability values or environmental values? I will come back to this issue later. These 
kinds of conflicts of value are often seen in environmental planning processes, but complex policy 
problems also emerge in other policy areas. Recent discussions about education, readjustments to the 
health care system and problems related to child welfare have proven this. However, I will mostly 
refer to environmental problems in this speech, since that is where my expertise lies. 
 
Complex policy issues have another characteristic that makes them special: they often occur within 
actor networks. A large number of actors are often involved in these complex policy problems, all of 
whom have an interest in the policy issue, and they often hold the necessary means to a solution of the 
problem. For example, without the financial support of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works 
and the Ministry of Housing, Regional Development and the Environment, a solution would have been 
unthinkable in the Delft case. However, the Delft municipality, as the local authority, was also 
indispensable. If we delve deeper into this, we can suddenly see that there are, in fact, many actors of 
more or less importance. These include residents who can add legitimacy to decisions, private parties 
such as property developers who have the capacity to realise actual solutions, provinces as supporters 
and funders, and so on. In keeping with this, there are other aspects of the problem that cause more 
actors to surface, such as safety issues, environmental issues, etc.2 
 In short, solutions for complex policy issues often occur within networks of actors. Recent 
research that I conducted together with Jurian Edelenbos and Bram Steijn shows that more than 11 
different organisations are involved in an average environmental planning project in The Netherlands 
                                                 
1 The opposite of a wicked problem is a ‘controlled problem’. This is a problem about which there is little 
controversy and for which much undisputable scientific information can be found. 
2 This also means that the limitations of the network will always be more or less arbitrary and are closely 
connected with the boundary judgments of the actors and the researcher. It is possible to reduce this slightly 
arbitrary character. For instance, a survey can be conducted to find out the amount of contact that actors have 
with one another, and determine on the basis of that information who does and who does not belong to the 
network. However, this means that the choice shifts to the question of what frequency of contact will determine 
whether an actor is a part of the network, a choice that is still made by the researcher. In addition, the researcher 
has thus identified an empirical network. It is possible, however, that some actors are excluded from or show no 
interest in interaction, even if they seem interesting on the basis of their resources. Thus, from a normative as 
well as a practical viewpoint, the factual boundaries of the network may be undesirable or ineffective. Networks 
are on the one hand a very powerful and practical concept for analyzing complex policy problems and searching 
out solutions for complex problems, but on the other hand they also have an empirical and normative reality. 
(Klijn et al., 2008). These are organisations that are in regular contact with one another, although not 
equally so. This network-character increases the complexity of managerial processes.  
 
Effective governance: the focus of this inaugural speech 
This development, where decision-making increasingly occurs within networks of actors and 
agreement on the nature of the problem and the desired solution seems trickier every time, has not 
gone unnoticed in the field of public administration. 
 The literature often refers to the fact that in western society, and perhaps even beyond that, we 
are dealing with a transition from government to governance (Pierre, 2000; Frederickson, 2005; 
Sorenson & Torfing, 2007; Klijn, 2005). This is a transition in which we are moving from a situation 
where public actors handle problems mostly through vertical steering, for example with the help of 
law and legislation or more or less unilateral policy measures executed by civilians and social 
organisations, to a situation of horizontal steering, where policy outcomes are, sometimes perforce, 
realised in cooperation with a large variety of public, private and semi-private organisations. An 
interesting recent illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in the determination of the number of 
hours of lessons for secondary schools.  
 
Recently, there has been much discussion about the minimum number of lessons that secondary 
schools should offer their students. This subject appeared on the agenda due to complaints by parents 
about the cancellation of lessons and led to a national discussion about the quality of education. The 
Lower Chamber thought it should take action with regard to this dossier, and initiated a minimum 
lessons norm for the number of lessons that schools would be obliged to offer per year: 1040 lesson 
hours. It is interesting that the Department of Education had earlier (2005) argued in favour of a 
bandwidth, but this proposal was rejected by the Chamber at that time. There had to be a universal, 
univocal norm for all schools. The schools inspectorate began to enforce the norm, the State Secretary 
got her teeth into it and imposed fines, and resistance against the norm grew, not only in society but 
specifically in the schools. After all, the schools had indicated from the beginning that the proposed 
norm was not feasible. Lo and behold, before long, the first hesitations were visible in the Chamber, 
who had themselves initiated this subject. This dossier is currently the subject of continuing 
discussions as part of the quality agreements between the State Secretary and the education sector.  
 This case shows beautifully how complex and dynamic an apparently simple issue such as 
determining the number of lessons in schools can be. The implementation is often more complex than 
it seems. This also shows the current difficulty of these kinds of dossiers to steer developments from a 
central political point. I will come back to this issue later.  
 The pivotal question I ask in this inaugural speech3 and in the research programme I would 
like to devote myself to in the years to come, is: under what conditions do networks involved in 
complex policy issues, which I will refer to as governance networks later on, ensure an effective 
approach to these problems? This must be an approach that also meets the democratic demands of our 
society. 
 The title of this inaugural speech already indicates the direction I wish to take, but I do not 
mean to suggest that the entire search has already been completed, although an important element can 
be found there, as I will explain later. I will return to the Delft case, which I introduced at the 
beginning of my speech, a few more times to illustrate a number of my statements.  
 
2 Governance and governance networks: what are we talking about? 
 
The term ‘governance’ has been a buzzword for some time. Scientifically, it has attracted much 
attention, especially from Public Administration.4 I would even go so far as to say that governance is 
more or less the new consensus in Public Administration, after the idea in the 1980s that ‘New Public 
Management’ would become the new consensus (also see: Osborne, 2006; Bekkers et al., 2007; Klijn, 
                                                 
3 I wish to thank Joop Koppejan, Marlies Post and Sandra van Tiel for their comments on earlier versions of this 
inaugural speech. This naturally does not exonerate me from taking full responsibility for this text.  
4 However, attention has also been paid to it in practice. This term is frequently found in policy documents and 
numerous branches have their own governance codes. 
2008b). This is an observation which, in itself, should made us modest though in pronouncing a new 
consensus. Science also has its modes. 
 There has been a deluge of articles about governance or its related concepts, such as 
governance networks, in scientific publications.5 The American Public Administration scientist 
Frederickson (2005) says, in his overview on governance in the Handbook of Public Management, that 
‘governance is everywhere’, and he is not alone in thinking that much, if not everything, seems to be 
about governance (see: Rhodes, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Bekkers et al., 2007; Klijn, 2008b). At the same 
time, it should be noted that there are still many government tasks where the dominant mode is 
classical vertical steering as well as a strong focus on internal organisation of the government 
machinery, which, according to the literature, corresponds with the terminology of government and is 
opposed to governance. Just think of classical government tasks such as the levying of taxes, 
administration of justice, the police / maintenance of order, and so on.6 There are also other ‘simple’ 
public tasks, such as waste collection and social security, although social security often involves rather 
more complicated processes than are initially expected. There have been many discussions about 
privatization with regard to executive tasks, such as prisons, the granting of subsidies, the land 
registry, and so on, for good reason. Often, simpler government tasks have a somewhat lower ‘wicked 
problem’ level. 
 
Governance and governance networks 
Governance has been defined in many different ways by many different authors. I do not wish to 
devote my speech to a precise treatment of the concept of governance or the many meanings it has 
been laden with in the course of the debate, because I wish to focus on other themes.7 There is 
consensus in most of the literature that with governance, the processes of decision-making and 
management are stressed instead of the organisation, and that these processes can usually be 
characterised as being strongly horizontal and complex, due to the large number of actors involved as 
well as the complexity of the problems (see: Rhodes, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Sorenson & Torfing, 2007). I 
do not think there is much reason to differentiate between governance and governance networks. At 
best, we can specify that governance relates to the interaction process (and its guidance) while 
networks relate to the empirical phenomenon that policy issues are solved within networks of actors.8 
                                                 
5 Scopus alone counts over 8,000 articles in the last 15 years (in the category of the social sciences, but Public 
Administration and urban and rural planning take up a fair share) in which the word governance can be found in 
the title, abstract or subtitle (when the scope is broadened, for example by including economics, the number 
exceeds 10,000). If we look at the numbers per year, a steady growth can be observed in the number of articles 
about governance, with rapid increases after 1996 and in the period after 2003 (1990:12; 1991: 7; 1992: 19; 
1993: 28; 1994: 54; 1995: 64; 1996: 106; 1997: 248; 1998: 346; 1999: 408; 2000: 548; 2001: 574; 2002: 621; 
2003: 715; 2004: 866; 2005: 1059; 2006: 1133; 2007: 1193. The word ‘networks’ gives even more ‘hits’. 
6 These tasks can be very complicated (and so are some patterns of the maintenance of law and order!), but – and 
this is the point here – they all show characteristics of what is called government. 
7 I have already done this in other places (Klijn, 2005, 2008a, 2008b). 
8 There are authors who equate governance with New Public Management or group the trends and developments 
that have come from New Public Management under the denominator of governance (for an overview, see for 
example Rhodes, 1997; Bekkers et al., 2007). In these cases, authors are usually referring to the changes that 
have taken place in many countries with regard to the organisation of the government machinery. Changes that 
have resulted in increased efficiency, the separation of policy-making and policy execution and the distancing of 
many executive government services are stressed. This way of looking at the government, which is strongly 
oriented by economic thinking, stresses performance indicators, free market processes and performance 
incentives as core concepts to achieve more efficient government services. In the famous words of Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992): the government should steer and not row, with which they want to indicate that public officials 
should limit themselves to assessing targets, and leave the complex process of execution as much as possible to 
independent services, or private or semi-private organisations. This is an appealing thought, indeed, for many 
politicians. It is, after all, a plea for the rehabilitation of the primacy of politics! This is, of course, until they find 
out that they really have to know what they want in this representation of management, and that they have to 
record this precisely, in distinct specificity, about the product, service or policy outcome that is to be achieved. 
After all, nothing can be outsourced and tested against clear performance indicators if what is desired has not 
been recorded! Above all, you should not change your mind midway through. Political reality, however, tends to 
be obstinate and managerial problems are often tricky. However, representing this New Public Management-
Thus, I will use governance networks as an indication of more or less stable patterns of social 
relationships (= interactions, cognitions and rules) between mutually dependent public, semi-public 
and private actors, that arise and build up around complex policy issues or policy programmes.9 It is 
characteristic for these patterns of social relationships to exist over a longer period of time, and they 
can change over time as a result of the interactions between the actors involved and their 
interpretations (for a more elaborate discussion of these ideas, see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Governance networks manifest themselves in concrete policy interactions, which I call policy games, 
between actors. During these games, the actors atttempt to influence policy issues, but they also re-
interpret the available information and informal and formal rules that were generated earlier.10 In short, 
governance networks can be characterised by a high degree of complexity and dynamics (Teisman et 
al., 2008), which makes it very difficult to manage them. Managers and other involved parties are 
often in for many surprises, because unexpected events occur or because the interactions between the 
strategic choices of the individual actors create unexpected effects.  
 This has been shown to be the case time and time again in the Delft case, and culminated in 
the sudden decision by Minister Peijs of the Transport and Public Works department to drop the 
financial reservation for the project from the MIT in 2003. That decision was the result of active 
lobbying by the management of Dutch Rail, Prorail and others for more funds for railway 
maintenance, and of the fact that part of the ministry had never really been convinced of the 
Spoorzone Delft project, or, in any case, was not prepared to pay so much money for it. This shows 
how complex policy games in governance networks can become when they are also connected with 
other policy games in other networks. This should, in fact, not really have surprised the Delft 
municipality, because their original funds had been obtained in 1998 from the budget for the A4 
Midden Delfland, another large environmental planning project, and the parties involved in that 
project had been just as surprised at the time, as the parties involved in Delft were in 2003.  
 
Governance and governance networks: not technocratic but political! 
I have already spoken of the ‘wicked’ character of policy issues in governance networks. However, I 
have not yet touched on the misunderstanding with regard to governance and governance networks 
that exists in some parts of the literature, that governance is a technocratic matter. Especially in the 
United States, there are a large number of publications that describe governance as a technocratic 
management process. ‘Governance is the way government get its jobs done.’11 This is clearly an 
important aspect of governance. Not one single political system, especially a democratic political 
system, can do without the output legitimacy, without their citizens recognizing and acknowledging 
that good results are realised. However, governance processes are intrinsically political in nature, 
because it is essentially a struggle between values.  
 If we consider politics to be the authoritative allocation of values, following Easton (1953), as 
many political and Public Administration scientists prefer to, I would say that this kind of politics has 
been removed, as argued earlier by others (Bovens et al., 1995). Politics has been dissolved, as it were, 
                                                                                                                                                        
approach of management as governance is definitely a misconception. The New Public Management, certainly in 
its original meaning, is mainly focused on the internal organisation of the government machinery (even when 
execution can be considered as part of a policy cycle, it still remains the cycle of an internally-oriented 
organisation, and this is far from the governance representation, where other autonomous organisations come 
into the picture as co-determiners of policy targets). Insofar as extreme relations are concerned, these are 
characterised by intrinsic univocality and relational hierarchy, while most governance processes are 
characterised by intrinsic ambiguity and relational equality. I certainly do not rule out the possibility that both 
approaches are capable of learning from each other and influencing each other, but originally, they are two very 
different theoretical approaches aimed at very different empirical phenomena. 
9 Despite the stability in the relations of the network, interactions within networks can still be capricious, because 
actors deploy their own strategies. For an elaboration of this point, see Koppejan & Klijn, 2004; Klijn, 2007. 
10 Governance networks can thus be seen as the temporarily solidified form of these policy games: the pattern of 
interactions at a certain moment in time, the set of perceptions of the actors (and the resemblances and 
differences) at that moment and the set of valid informal and formal rules at that moment.  
11This quote is taken from Kettl (Kettl, 2002, XI, quoted by Frederickson, 2005, p. 286). In the American 
literature about networks, there is a strong focus on the technical character of network management, while the 
European literature pays more attention to value choices in relation to democratic bodies (see Klijn, 2008b).  
or at least been partially dissolved, in the network itself, where the struggle between all the different 
groups is taking place (also see Klijn & Skelcher, 2007).12 Also, the political institutions, the Lower 
Chamber, city councils, Provincial States and political parties are in the middle of the network of 
actors, instead of realizing the public interest far above the turmoil of battle. Thus, the often-heard 
complaint that all these networks and involvement of interest groups are a threat to democracy 
essentially means that we no longer recognize politics as a visible centre of power. I will come back to 
this point later, because I think that there are a few paradoxes here that I want to touch on in this 
speech, and that are also a part of the research programme I have set out for myself in the years to 
come. 
 
3 The search for good, socially relevant outcomes 
 
How will we find ‘good’, socially relevant outcomes from these complex and political processes in 
governance networks?13 This is a question that is more easily asked than answered.  
 
Simple tasks, simple answers? 
Finding out what good results are in the context of governance networks is, in itself, rather tricky. This 
is strongly connected to the ‘wicked’ character of the policy issues in governance networks.  
 This seems relatively simple for a classic government task such as taxation. We assess the 
outcomes of the tax authorities as ‘good’ when the taxation is performed efficiently and fairly. Thus, 
when the tax authorities do not make too many mistakes and do not send wrong assessments, and 
when the entire process is wrapped up in time and when people are not too displeased with it, we can 
say that a good result has been achieved. It is also relatively simple to translate these kinds of 
requirements for a good outcome and a good process (the taxation itself) into relatively simple 
performance criteria, such as the desired pass time of an application, the number of allowed mistakes, 
and so on. As you will see, we now find ourselves in the world of the New Public Management (Hood, 
1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). We have a fairly clear picture of what we want, and how we want to 
monitor it. We can also link an organisation to this relatively easily. An executive service, such as the 
tax authorities, but also related tasks, such as social welfare subsidies and the determination of 
punishment (prisons), can be privatized in a relatively simple way, or ‘hived off’ or organized as a 
separate agency and monitored through prior determined performance indicators. Problems do occur 
regularly even with tasks such as these which can be quantified quite easily. Executive processes and 
the agencies that perform them are nearly always more complex than anticipated beforehand. 
Executive government bodies also regularly come under fire. We must realise, however, that only a 
small proportion of the total number of bodies are usually involved, and that media attention in fact 
usually involves a strong magnification of the problems (Van Thiel, 2008).  
 
The political dimension of network outcomes: a battle of values 
Regrettably, things do not work as simply with the more complex decision-making processes, as my 
opening case has shown. In these kinds of processes, it is often not very clear what a good outcome is, 
or which criteria should be used to assess a good outcome. Let us go back to the Delft case, which I 
                                                 
12 I find myself coming from a long Dutch history with this view. Daalder (1984) has already stated: “If nor the 
operation of a multi-party system with decreasing social bonds, nor the interweaving between government and 
social groups offers a firm basis for policy from the top down, the possibility exists of an appeal to plebiscitary 
support and a regression into doctrines that we hoped we had overcome, about the high mission of the state, 
above the parties, above parliament and above society. A ‘primacy of politics’, in that sense, is in a way un-
Dutch. It is also a definition of ‘politics’ that is far too restrictive for me, as if politics is not being made 
everywhere in society and government, even if one chooses to call it something else.” (Daalder, 1984, p. 22).  
13 A policy proposal in this view is better when (see Kloppenjan & Klijn, 2004): 
 • more of the actors involved are content with the proposal (satisfying criterion, see also 
Teisman, 1992); 
 •  later versions of the proposal are more capable of incorporating criticisms of earlier  
 versions (intrinsic quality); 
 • the proposal does not charge the costs of the solution unilaterally outside the actors  
  involved/the network. 
have just discussed. Is an extra viaduct a good outcome? Perhaps it would be for Dutch Rail, but 
definitely not for the municipality or for the neighbours. This solution would actually worsen the 
problem for these parties. An extra viaduct would increase the amount of noise and pollution for the 
neighbours because of the larger rail capacity, and the barrier-effect of the railway would become even 
stronger.  
 
The reason for the fact that univocal criteria for good outcomes are not easily defined has to do with 
the conflict of values in complex policy issues that I mentioned earlier. Here, transport values conflict 
with liveability values, economic values and environmental values. All these different values are 
represented by different actors, who all want to be involved in the decision-making process. There is 
nothing illegitimate about this, because it is a part of a mature democracy in which actors can 
articulate their interests and where decision-making is a relatively open process.  
 From this point of view, complaints about lengthy decision procedures, too many interest 
groups, and so on seem questionable. Faultfinders often really mean that their values are traded off too 
much against other values. These include ministries who find that interactive processes only lead to 
superfluous discussion sessions, as for instance during the Investigation Phase Space Problem 
Mainport Rotterdam (VERM-phase) of the Maasvlakte II-project in the period between 1996 and 1997 
(see: Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Alternatively, they feel that decision-making takes too long, and think 
that they can simplify the decision-making process to find a solution by unilaterally making some 
decisions. One example of this is the current Minister of Transport and Public Works’ ideas for an 
urgent law procedure. 
 However, in my view, this repudiates the essence of these kinds of processes, the value 
conflict and in line with that, the fact that we often do not have cut-and-dry answers for these 
problems, no matter how eagerly the media makes us believe that we do. Many of these issues involve 
problems we have little knowledge of, or whose knowledge is contested, where we differ in opinions 
about the desired solutions and which involves the interests of civilians or other groups of people. 
These are problems we just cannot solve with quick unilateral measures, and for which we must search 
for solutions during the decision-making process, and attempt to assess which solutions would be 
acceptable for the parties involved. The decision-making process itself is a quest for solutions and the 
collection of the necessary information to be able to do so. It is an attempt to unite the various values 
with one another. To put it another way and repeat what I stated earlier: these kinds of complex 
processes are politics to the core, because what is politics if not a battle of values? 
 This means that we can only judge the outcomes of complex processes in networks by 
checking if a good attempt was made to combine the various values. This usually has to be done 
through the process itself. Only there do actors learn about the possibilities, does new information 
become available, and where creativity is required, because many different parties must be satisfied. 
 If interesting social content and outcomes are developed during the decision-making process, 
the idea of a common interest literally has become an empty concept, and something that can only 
refer to the generally accepted ways in which we have organised our actions (such as the general 
principles for good management, an open and accessible process, etc.). Policy proposals should be 
able to be justified and withstand criticism in a sound open democracy. They have to be capable of 
acquiring support from a solid coalition of actors, and this can be achieved by taking the interests of 
the parties involved into account when developing solutions and connecting them with one another.14 
A healthy distrust of actors who appeal to the common interest seems appropriate. 
 For example, in the Delft case, what was initially a simple plan for a tunnel evolved over the 
years into a much more complicated plan, in which town planning, multiple use of space, safety and 
other themes found a place, and this increased the amount of support for the proposal among various 
ministries (Ministry for the Interior, Ministry for Housing, Regional Development and the 
Environment and the Finance Department) and other authorities (province, Haaglanden region, and so 
on; see: Klijn, 2007). Comparable processes can be seen with other environmental planning processes 
(see for instance: De Bruijn et al., 2004). 
  
4 ‘It’s the management, stupid!’ : the crucial role of network management 
                                                 
14 See note 9. 
 If good outcomes are to be achieved in complex decision-making processes that are not easy to 
control, then the way in which these processes are managed is probably very important. If we take 
another look at the Delft case, you will see that management and steering activities, which I will call 
network management15, took up a lot of energy. The municipality invested a lot of energy in involving 
various actors in the process and also in maintaining these contacts. Much energy also went into 
continuously improving the content of the plan, and monitoring where these improvements linked up 
with policy ideas, policy programmes and the interests of other actors, especially the various 
ministries. In this way, the planning phase involved an attempt to link up to the government’s wishes 
with regard to public-private cooperation, the policy objectives from the Ministry for Housing, 
Regional Development and the Environment about innovative use of space and ideas from the 
Ministry of the Interior about safety effect reports and how they should be processed in concrete 
proposals for projects. At the same time, regular consultations with tenants and local economic actors 
were arranged. Also, the purchase of buildings that had to be demolished was begun, ways in which 
the tunnel could be built were investigated, and so on. Network management, that is, conscious 
attempts to govern the process as well as the content of governance networks and to facilitate and 
speed up the decision-taking process, was one of the main ingredients in the case and also one of the 
most important reasons why the rail tunnel dossier ended up on the national and regional agendas 
again after the completion of the discussion about the high-speed rail link, and it was also why the 
attention towards the Delft rail tunnel issue faded again after 1992 (Klijn, 2007). 
 
The importance of network management in complex decision-making processes 
Every project leader of an extensive environmental planning project in The Netherlands or anywhere 
else knows that it takes a lot of dedication, many management activities and a great many management 
skills to ensure success. This is also obvious from the Public Administration research that has been 
performed in the past on these cases (see for example: Edelenbos & Monninkhof, 2001; De Bruijn et 
al., 2004; Klijn et al., 2006). Together with Jurian Edelenbos, not long ago I looked at a few 
interactive decision-making processes, and compared them with one another. We looked at the way in 
which they were managed, the kinds of relations that existed with political institutions involved in the 
project, i.e. mainly city councils, the way in which different parties were involved, the outcomes and 
whether the parties involved were content with it.16 Our conclusion was that the processes that could 
be characterised as having had good (network) management resulted in outcomes the involved parties 
were satisfied with (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006). An interesting and rather unexpected outcome was 
that, in general, the relationship with political institutions was not very strong, nor was it decisive for 
achieving good outcomes and satisfaction from the actors. 
 One possible criticism is that since the research was based on qualitative research into a 
number of cases, how can we be sure that these outcomes represent a more general pattern? Together 
with Jurian Edelenbos and Bram Steijn, I recently conducted research among respondents involved in 
environmental planning projects. We asked them questions about the outcome of environmental 
planning projects, about the presence of certain network management activities and about trust, but 
also asked various questions about the characteristics of the project, such as organisational form and 
the level of complexity. I am unable to provide a detailed description of the research here, but it is 
interesting to note that we found a clear relationship between the number and the intensity of the 
applied network management strategies and good outcomes. Projects in which many network 
management strategies are applied (according to the respondents) are characterised by a high valuation 
of the outcomes (Steijn et al., 2008).  
                                                 
15 By network management, I mean the conscious governing and supervisory processes in governance networks. 
These activities can be aimed at the interactions (activation of actors, supervise interactions, create temporary 
organisational arrangements, and so on) as well as at content (explicit perceptions of actors, organise research 
activities, explore alternative options or launch new ideas for solutions, and so on; see Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). In this case, governance refers to the ways in which processes are steered in networks, which can be more 
or less subconscious (habits or routines) or determined outside the network (statutory regimes). All network 
management activities are governance, but not all governance (mechanisms) is network management. 
16 Following note 9, we considered the outcomes to be good when more parties were satisfied and when the 
policy proposals showed a certain amount of innovation (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006). 
 In addition, when we take a look at more recent international research, the importance of 
network management is also highlighted. Meier and O’Toole’s (see: Meier & O’Toole, 2001; Meier & 
O’Toole, 2007) extensive research into education districts in Texas, USA clearly shows that the 
network management activities of the district managers have an effect on education in any district. 
They have found positive correlations between the behaviour of the managers (more active contact 
with other organisations, etc.) and rather solid data such as the number of graduates. A lot of other 
work by American researchers has also shown the positive effects of network management (see for 
example work by Agranoff (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003) and by Mandell (Mandell, 2003).  
 
Research into the effects of processes in governance networks is still in its infancy, despite the fact 
that a lot of research into network decision-making has already been conducted. Most research so far 
has been concerned more with the course of processes, the behaviour of managers, access to actors 
involved, and so on. Systematic comparative research into the effects of network management 
activities is still rare. Part of the reason for this may be because the effects are not easily measured. 
After all, there can be many different results, and actors assess the outcomes quite differently. This 
makes systematic research into the effects of governance networks quite complicated.  
 Yet, the aforementioned outcomes of research seem to indicate that network management is a 
very important factor in understanding what makes governance networks effective, in the sense of 
producing socially relevant outcomes. This will be an important topic in the research I intend to 
conduct in the years to come. Since it is probable that the context determines the most effective 
management strategies, I do not want to limit this research to The Netherlands, but instead, will make 
an attempt at international comparisons.  
 
The importance of network management in comparison with other possible factors 
It is quite possible that further research into the role of network management will reveal even more 
important information than research into other factors, such as the chosen organisational forms in 
cooperation processes. For instance, we have not found a relationship in our research between the form 
of the projects, such as a project group, a project organisation, a formal legal form or no organisational 
form, and the outcomes of the projects (Klijn et al., 2008). Also, recently, Michiel Kort, who is a 
doctoral student whom I supervise, could find no relationship between the organisational form of the 
Urban Regeneration Companies ( Wijk Ontwikkelings Maatschappijen) and the outcomes, in his 
research.. These examples do not provide conclusive proof, but they may indicate that we tend to 
overestimate the importance of the chosen organisational form for the realisation of outcomes in 
complex policy processes.  
 An explanation for this last finding could be that in the case of complex processes, managers 
have to deploy the whole range of network management strategies anyway in order to achieve good 
results. To put it more concretely: for a public-private partnership project, it simply does not matter 
whether it is being cast in a separate legal organisation as a consortium, or that there is ‘only’ a project 
group structure. In order to achieve interesting results, managers of both organisational forms will 
have to use the whole repertoire of network management strategies anyway. Our survey research of 
the respondents in environmental planning projects has also shown this. We were unable to establish a 
relationship between the organisational form and the number of network management strategies used 
(see: Klijn et al., 2008). In other words, , the form is not predicative of the number and the kinds of 
strategies used.  
 The research programme that I wish to undertake in the years to come should furnish a sturdier 
foundation for these primary results. This will help meet the challenge of developing more refined 
evaluation methods that do justice to the varied diversity of outcomes and judgements that are at issue 
with governance networks. 
 
Network management is also political in nature! 
Good network management is of course no guarantee for success. Processes in governance networks 
remain complex and can be influenced by unexpected developments, such as political changes or other 
events. Yet, in view of the above-mentioned research outcomes, it does not seem too bold of a 
proposition to consider factor network management as one of the central explanations for achieving 
good outcomes of processes in governance networks.  
 However, one important point must be made here. Earlier, I characterised governance 
processes in governance networks as political. They are, after all, about the battle between value 
conflicts. This means that the network management required to govern these processes and to achieve 
a favourable conclusion is political. In contrast with other representations that view management as a 
technical operation, I consider management to be a strongly political activity, at least network 
management as I analyze it in this inaugural speech. After all, the network manager is important for 
the way in which solutions are being sought, and for which value issues are and are not addressed, but 
also for the selection of actors and how selection processes are organised. This also means that the 
activities of managers, because there can be many in a complex process, should be subjected to 
accountability and openness. Here we touch on the important issue of the relationship between 
networks and the regular institutions of our parliamentary democracy (see, for an overview: Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007; Sørenson & Torfing, 2007), but also the important issue of how decision-making and 
management in governance networks can be democratically embedded (Sørenson, 2002; Skelcher & 
Sullivan, 2007). This is the next theme I wish to address in this speech.  
 
5 Drama-democracy and democratic anchorage of decision-making in governance 
 networks 
 
How does this discussion about networks, complex decision-making and value conflicts relate to our 
prevailing political processes? 
 
The Political spectacle: a world in itself! 
When it comes to politics, the average person on the street usually thinks of developments in or at the 
Binnenhof in The Hague or at the White House, or of all the other places in the world where 
parliaments and central governments do their work. These places are even often referred to as ‘inner 
circles’, because they sometimes seem like a world in themselves (see: Van der Berg & Molleman, 
1974). Hundreds of journalists attempt every day to pick up shreds of news for their newspapers or 
other media, and every remark, no matter how innocent, is collected, sounded and magnified in 
newspapers, news items or talk shows. On their part, politicians use the media to draw attention to 
their careers or plans or to speed them up. The impression this makes sometimes is that politics and 
the media are more involved with each other than with anything else.  
 I am not the only one, nor the first, to have observed this. It has, in fact, been expressed more 
aptly by others. The democratic political process seems to have increasingly become a drama-
democracy, to use a term coined by the Belgian social scientist Elchardus (Elchardus, 2002). He has 
shown that news and media processes have become more important in the democratic political 
process. In addition, the news has become more individualized and individuals have taken on more 
importance. Although this may not yet be happening on the same magnitude in Europe as in the USA, 
the trend is unmistakable. On the other hand, and linked to this, is the fact that politics has become 
more and more theatrical, which has largely been boosted by the media. In the drama-democracy, with 
its focus on individuals and powerful imagery, it is crucial for the politician to direct his performance, 
but he can also be ‘demonised’ by the media processes. A slip of the tongue, a strong one-liner or a 
mistake is instantly placed on media like YouTube or is distributed numerous times via text 
messages.17 
 To govern then becomes to communicate continuously, and policy announcements become 
much more important than policy implementation. After all, policy announcements are news in a 
drama-democracy, while the implementation is much less newsworthy, except when things go wrong. 
Implementation is even dangerous, because enemies can be made during the execution, and one can be 
damaged by problems that occur during the implementation. Elchardus defines the rules of a drama-
democracy as follows: ‘In a drama-democracy it is tempting to score via communication and 
                                                 
17 One of the most striking examples from 2008 in The Netherlands is the interview with Minister Vogelaar 
(ministry of Housing and responsible for a large renewal program for deteriorated city ars in The Netherlands), 
when she was questioned critically and to which she had no answer. Fragments of the interview could be seen on 
YouTube shortly after the broadcast, and so could be reviewed by many time and again, rather than be quickly 
forgotten.  
representation. That is usually easier than clearing files and taking decisions, activities with which one 
always has the possibility of making enemies. A communication strategy takes up the place of 
ideology, announcing measures takes the place of taking measures, the convincing language replaces a 
supportive concept.’ (Elchardus, 2002, p. 82, also see: Luyendijk, 2006, on how news is made).18 
 The remarks made by Elchardus in a sense echo the analyses of Edelman in the 1970s. 
Edelman (1977, 1988) talked about ‘Words that succeed, policies that fail’, by which he wanted to 
indicate that politics is mainly a verbal game, whose actual outcomes are not really important.19 This 
representation of the political game is considered too gloomy by some, and perhaps it is a little in the 
representation of these two authors, but it does furnish an explanation for the continuing call for more 
steering, more decisiveness and stronger leadership in an administrative world that is becoming more 
and more complex and that requires dedicated political leadership on processes for a longer period of 
time. The image of the strong leader suits a personified, media-political world. The risks facing strong 
leaders, when they do not fulfil the high hopes placed upon them, is naturally high.20 We tire quickly 
of our heroes in a drama-democracy. 
 
The drama-democracy: an example 
We only have to look at a recent political-administrative dossier such as the lessons norm for schools, 
which I mentioned at the beginning of this speech, to show the workings of the drama-democracy. The 
media commotion about the 1040 lesson-hours norm occurred, on the one hand, because schools could 
not meet the requirements of the norm and took all sorts of measures to find ways to meet it anyway, 
and on the other hand, because the LAKS, the national action committee for school pupils, took up the 
issue to create a distinct profile of themselves. The school demonstrations seen on television, 
organized by LAKS, were organised rapidly through modern communication strategies (text 
messaging, msn and YouTube) and the issue became widely known.21 Through catchy terminology, 
such as ophokuren (penning-up hours), to describe lessons that schools instituted when lessons are 
cancelled due to sickness or other causes, further trouble was stirred. Consequently, unparalleled 
media hype was created. The media did not only take over coverage of the LAKS-activities, but also 
created a situation where each statement by the responsible state secretary and others was magnified 
through one-liners. The same state secretary, cornered by the media, got her teeth stuck in the subject 
more and more. Her slip of the tongue in the Lower Chamber, that schools should simply work harder, 
could be downloaded immediately from new media outlets. In the meantime, the contents of the 
proposal, to ensure and improve the quality of education, gradually disappeared from view. 
 
Drama-democracy and governance networks: clashing worlds! 
                                                 
18 The strength of the drama-democracy has already been shown through the presentation of the Dijsselbloem 
committee, the parliamentary committee that reported on the effects of the system changes in education. The 
central message of the parliamentary committee was that politics wishes to utilize education for too many 
objectives, subjects education to too many unilaterally imposed measures without ever having researched what 
these measures concretely mean in daily practice, and does not listen to voices from the field. Less than 24 hours 
after publication of the report, one member of Parliament submitted a proposal for a subject in the school 
curriculum. 
19 Following Edelman, other authors have also used this image. Fisher’s representation (Fisher, 2003) resembles 
Elchardus and Edelman quite closely. He states: ‘Politicians and the media, as Edelman has shown, have turned 
contemporary politics into a political spectacle that is experienced more like a stage drama than reality itself. 
Based on socially constructed stories designed more to capture the interest of the audience than to offer factual 
portrayal events, the political spectacle is constructed by a set of political symbols and signifiers that 
continuously construct and reconstruct self-conceptions, the meaning of past events, expectations for the future, 
and the significance of prominent social groups (…). The spectacle of politics is a modern-day fetish, a creation 
in part of political actors that come to dominate the thoughts and activities of both its audience and the actors 
themselves’ (Fisher, 2003, p. 58). 
20 The quick decline of President Bush’s popularity in the USA is an example of this. Despite all the criticisms 
(especially from Europe), his popularity remained high for a long time, until it became clear that he could not 
fulfill the high hopes he had announced with regard to Iraq, crises and the war on terrorism.  
21 It is also interesting that there were various sites where the arguments of the LAKS were criticized, and where 
many nuanced stories about the 1040 lesson-hours norm could be found. These sites were hardly noticed by the 
media and the Ministry of Education. The media clearly chose to give the LAKS standpoint a lot of attention.  
In this way, a strange split occurs, in which a significant part of empirical decision-making takes place 
within complex processes in which involved interests, including involved groups of citizens, attempt 
to intervene themselves, or at least to become involved. This is where politics is conducted intensively, 
but not always recognizably, and where processes require long-term dedication and a lot of network 
management in order to bring them to a favourable conclusion. On the other hand, the politics visible 
to the media and the citizen takes place more and more in an almost surrealistic media landscape, 
which requires powerful imagery, quick decision-making and clear steering. This call, as we have 
often observed, leads to strong intervention in complex processes, which often backfires. Politicians 
intervene in complex network-like processes through what they consider to be powerful measures, and 
in doing so are more likely to disrupt the results that have already been achieved.22  
 The rules of the drama-democracy, the stress on theatre, quick communication and individuals, 
seem to clash hard with those of complex decision-making processes in governance networks. The 
complex policy processes usually take a long time, are not easily communicated in terms of fast, 
simple measures, many unexpected events are possible and a lot can go wrong. These large projects 
are thus usually a thorn in the flesh of political authorities. 
 
Solution: democratic anchorage and openness? 
In the discussion on drama-democracy, the analysis is more strongly represented than proposals for 
good solutions. Many seek to boost the parliamentary system, to separate politics from the media (see: 
Elchardus, 2002), or little attention is paid to the relationship between media and democracy.23 The 
relationship between media and politics is probably a fact that will not be easily changed. New means 
of communication will probably increase the variety of media sources, but on the other hand will 
much sooner strengthen the nature of the drama-democracy, the stress on individuals, communication, 
the importance of media attention and the dominance of policy proposals over policy implementation. 
At the same time, complex processes in governance networks are linked to the world of the drama-
democracy, if only because many policy proposals coming from the governance networks require 
financing. Support from public opinion can, thus, be of vital importance for complex decision-making 
processes at times. 
 This means that, in governance networks, various forms of democratic anchorage will have to 
be sought in order to provide the proposals with (political) legitimacy, and to make sure they survive 
in the drama-democracy. This makes the task of the network manager even more demanding.  
 This anchorage can be shaped in various ways (also see: Sørensen & Torfing, 2005; Skelcher 
et al., 2005; Bekkers et al., 2007; Skelcher & Sullivan, 2007).24 One is that political authorities 
themselves can take on the role of network manager, or at least partially fulfil this role themselves. 
The political legitimization of the policy issue or policy project the governance network forms itself 
                                                 
22 Halfway through a complex process about the Zuidplaspolder, supervised by the province of Zuid Holland, 
another department of the province introduced, with political support, a reorganisation proposal for the 
municipalities concerned. There are many examples of strongly disruptive political interventions, which seem to 
be motivated by media attention or a sudden need for decisiveness, rather than by knowledge of the process 
itself. The 1040 lesson-hours norm mentioned earlier is also an example of this.  
23 In parliamentary circles, much more attention is paid to strengthening democracy.   
24 The concept of democratic anchorage refers to the way in which processes in governance networks are linked 
to notions of democratic representation. Much attention is paid to links with traditional political institutions 
(parliament, city council, provincial states), but democratic anchorage can also refer to other principles of 
democratic representation, such as the direct influence of citizens, grassroots representation and procedures with 
the actors involved in decision-making, and election rules of special institutional arrangements that have been 
instituted (such as consultation structures, soundboard groups, and so on; for instance see: Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2002; Skelcher et al., 2005). For instance, Sørensen & Torfing list four ways of viewing democratic anchorage: 
 • Are networks controlled by democratically elected politicians? 
 • Do networks represent the interests, preferences and opinions of the members of the various 
  groups that are a part of the network? 
 • Is the representation divided over territorially defined groups of citizens? 
 • Are the networks democratically organised themselves, i.e. are they organised in accordance 
  with specific (democratic) rules? 
Other authors tend to stress the importance of process rules (for example, that networks should be accessible to 
the actors involved; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Edelenbos, 2005). 
around is then at least partly derived from the fact that the political authority, for instance an alderman 
or member of the provincial states, assumes direct responsibility for the decisions made, the progress, 
the (intermediate) results, and so on. This seems self-evident, but political authorities are often far 
from the heart of the decision-making in complex decision-making processes. It also frequently is the 
case that they quickly distance themselves from a project when it is in deep water. A different role is 
required from the political authorities, in which they have to interact, negotiate, and so on. People will 
probably say that that is happening now, because we see secretaries of state, ministers, etc. consulting 
the field all the time and paying working visits. While this is certainly the case, tension continues to 
exist between these activities and the world of the drama-democracy, which can decide at any moment 
that these activities are progressing too slowly or are not decisive enough.  
 In short, the role of the political authority as network manager will always be at loggerheads 
with the rules of the drama-democracy in which the political authority is depicted as the strong 
initiator of new proposals and where there is no patience for negotiating processes with interested 
parties, executors, or other parties that are involved. The political authority as network manager is 
more of an actor among the actors, rather than the big leader.  
 However, it is also possible to achieve democratic anchorage in various other ways. Examples 
include various forms of process agreements for the involvement of politicians and stakeholders, 
forms of direct involvement of stakeholders, usually referred to in The Netherlands as ‘interactive 
decision-making’, but also various forms of consumer involvement such as consumer panels (see: 
Edelenbos, 2000; Lowndes et al., 2001; McLaverty, 2002).  
 Various forms of democratic anchorage can also lead to greater variety in the number of 
solutions that are taken into consideration. Much research into interactive decision-making has shown 
this to be the case (see: Edelenbos & Monninkhof, 2001; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006), although, at the 
same time, we know from research that it is not always easy to use this variety well in the process, and 
to convey it in the results. In this sense, increasing democratic anchorage is not only recommendable 
from a normative point of view, but also from the viewpoint of effectiveness. In the aforementioned 
research into environmental planning projects, we found a clear relationship between the involvement 
of the stakeholders and the satisfaction of the respondents with the achieved result. These outcomes 
suggest that increasing democratic anchorage, in this case by involving stakeholders, is helpful for 
achieving satisfactory results. In my research programme for the years to come, I would like to pay 
more attention to the question of the ways in which various forms of democratic anchorage contribute 
to decision-making as well as the results of complex processes in governance networks, but also how 
they can be united with the rules of the drama-democracy. 
 
With the subject of democratic anchorage I have, I hope, connected the most important threads of this 
presentation together. My plea for the importance of network management in complex policy issues 
within governance networks and my observation that these kinds of processes are political  in nature 
link the care for democratic anchorage. 
 
6 Policy, politics and Public Administration: a research agenda? 
 
It is about time I conclude this speech. You will have understood by now that, after all these years, I 
continue to be fascinated with complex managerial processes, and how well, in this modern network 
society , we succeed in generating socially relevant outcomes that are democratically anchored, 
recognizable and able to be influenced by citizens. 
 
Research programme 
I aim to work on a research programme on the research issues I have just elaborated in the years to 
come. This requires further exploration into the effectiveness of governance networks, the ways in 
which they are managed and the way that complex policy issues are dealt with. It will also involve 
further research into the tension between these processes within regular political decision-making and 
into ways of maintaining managerial processes in governance networks as responsible, open and 
democratic as possible. This is undoubtedly required because the management of these processes has a 
strong political character and cannot be dismissed as being technocratic. With these research themes I 
find myself, I think, at the heart of the research programmes of the Rotterdam faculty of Public 
Administration. That, however, probably comes as no surprise, considering my lengthy stay here. 
 I consider the two elements of my teaching and research commitment, policy and 
management, to be inextricably bound up with each other. Management and policy in a complex 
society are now, more than ever before in the history of Public Administration, linked, and Public 
Administration has become a discipline that pursues the governance of societal problem-solving via 
direct effort, and no longer the study of government policy, which is what I was trained in as student 
of Public Administration in the 1970s. The field of Public Administration will continue to develop 
further in the decades to come. I would not be surprised if at least a part of that development concerns 
the question of how this governance takes place in a ‘mediatised’ world, in which pictures and 
emotions play an important role. Despite all this, as Public Administration scientists, we are used to 
putting the rational element, a logically chosen strategy, a meaningful argument and analysis of 
underlying perceptions, first. I will not conceal from you the fact that I consider the relationship 
between media and democracy with a certain amount of uneasiness. Yet the question of how a society 
that creates and recreates itself through media pictures will be governed remains an important one. I do 
not have an answer to that, but I have attempted to engage with this subject through a brief discussion 
of my view on drama-democracy. I hope I am still able to find time for this subject in the years to 
come.  
 
The Delft case: everything turned out fine 
I have yet to tell you the ending of my story about the Delft Spoorzone. What happened in Delft after 
the Ministry of Transport and Public Works removed the project from the MIT-list? As a matter of 
fact, everything turned out fine in the end. By the end of 2003, the Lower Chamber again stated that 
money had to be made available for the Delft Spoorzone. Although the minister initially disregarded 
this statement, later in 2004, money did, in fact, become available for the project. I have already 
shown that much attention was paid to network management in this project, and also that a plan was 
formulated that received the support of a broad coalition of involved parties. With regard to content, 
the project has been able to integrate many different values (for an extensive analysis, please see Klijn, 
2007). The success of this case can be attributed in large part to the intensive network management. 
 
8 A word of thanks 
 
To conclude, I wish to extend a few words of thanks. Firstly, I would like to thank all the people I 
have had the pleasure of writing and performing research with in past years. In alphabetical order, they 
are: Ellen van Bueren, Arwin van Buuren, Lex Cachet, Jasper Eshuis, Lasse Gerrits, Marcel van Gils, 
Michael Hughes, Peter Hupe, Walter Kickert, Michiel Kort, Filip de Rynck, Chris Skelcher, Arie van 
Sluis, Bram Steijn, Geert Teisman, Katrien Termeer, Mark van Twist en Joris Voets. I would like to 
include those I worked with long ago in my architecture days: Kees van der Flier, André Mulder and 
Henk Westra. I hope I have not forgotten to mention anyone. 
 
Now there are two people present here who may be thinking, “I have done some writing with him, but 
my name was not among those he just mentioned”. I wish to extend special thanks to Jurian Edelenbos 
and Joop Koppenjan, with whom I have written more than with anyone else, and always very gladly 
so. 
 
I wish to thank the Dean and board of governors of the University and the faculty of Social Science for 
the trust they have placed in me. I will do my utmost to live up to that trust. 
 
To the members of the faculty of Public Administration, 
I have known you a long time, and I know this is a good place to be. In the years to come, I hope to 
contribute to the growth of the department of Public Administration.  
 
To Professor Pollit and Professor Ringeling, 
I regard this chair as a combination of both your chairs. I hope that you will be content with the way I 
interpret it. Otherwise, I am sure you will know where to find me. 
 To the students of Public Administration, 
This is the best profession anyone can wish for, and I hope to share my fascination of solving complex 
policy issues with you for many years to come, and to convince you of the social and scientific 
relevance of this profession, in case you still have any doubts about it. 
 
To Professor Teisman, dear Geert, 
It has been our mutual pleasure to have worked together for many years. I expect that our cooperation 
will be just as fruitful in this new relationship as it was before. 
 
To Professor Skelcher, dear Chris, 
I have tremendously enjoyed our cooperation over the last three years and would like to thank you for 
the opportunity you gave me to look elsewhere and to stimulate my evolution through a visiting 
professorship in Birmingham. I look forward to our continued cooperation and friendship. 
 
To Henk Westra, 
Thank you for giving a young inexperienced graduate public administration student an opportunity to 
take his first steps into research. I am still grateful for that and for your support. 
 
Dear Dad, 
You have motivated me to read, debate and think critically from an early age. That has, without a 
doubt, contributed to the fact that I am standing here today. I still cherish memories from my youth 
when everybody was debating with one another, sometimes quite loudly. 
 
Dear Marlies, Anne and Sander, 
My smallest network is also my most important one, and every day you are the best distraction anyone 
could wish for. 
 
Dear Mom, 
You have been gone a very long time, but I still miss your enthusiasm. Don’t reach too high, you once 
said, and don’t worry, it’s only a simple professorship. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your time. 
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